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CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw - DUE PRocEss - RIGHT OF SECOND OFFENDER To 
PRE-SENTENCE HEARING REGARDING PRIOR CONVICTION - Relator was con-
victed of burglary in 1953 and of voluntary manslaughter in 1954. While 
passing sentence after the latter conviction, the court declared that it was 
exercising its discretion under the Habitual Criminal Act1 by imposing a 
double penalty on the relator. Neither relator nor his counsel objected to 
the procedure or demanded a hearing regarding the prior conviction.2 On 
petition for writ of habeas corpus, which was denied by the lower court, 
relator admitted the fact of his prior conviction. He asserted, however, that 
although the habitual criminal statute in terms contains no provision grant-
ing alleged second offenders notice and a hearing regarding the prior con-
viction, the trial court's failure to accord him such notice and hearing vio-
lated procedural due process. On appeal, held, cause remanded for 
1 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §5108 (1945). A person need not be formally indicted and 
convicted as a previous offender in order to be sentenced under the Habitual Criminal Act. 
PA. STAT. ANN. §5108 (e) (1945). 
2 In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, relater asserted that he had no knowledge 
of a right to a hearing regarding his prior conviction. The question of waiver was decided 
favorably to him. But see Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1959). See also New York 
v. Mattera, 179 N.Y.S.2d 970 (1958); Plasters v. Hoffman, 180 Kan. 559, 305 P.2d 858 (1957); 
Kendrick v. United States, 238 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Pennsylvania ex rel. Firmstone v. 
Burke, 175 Pa. Super. 128, 103 A.2d 476 (1954). 
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resentencing.3 In order to avoid a constitutional due process question, the 
Habitual Criminal Act will be construed to require the trial court to give 
an alleged second offender, before sentencing, notice and a hearing as to 
the prior conviction, even though the defendant is in fact a second offender 
and subject to an increased term. Pennsylvania ex rel. Dermendzin v. Myers, 
397 Pa. 607, 156 A. 2d 804 (1959). 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania based its decision in the principal 
case primarily upon United States ex rel. Collins v. Claudy.4 In that case, 
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found a denial of due process 
where a trial court sentenced a defendant under the Pennsylvania Habitual 
Criminal Act without informing him that he was being so sentenced, even 
though he was in fact a second offender.I'> The court in the principal case 
inferred from Collins that defendant was entitled to notice to enable him 
to present matters in mitigation of the prior offense; therefore, a hearing as 
well as notice was required. Neither Collins nor the instant case seems to 
give sufficient weight to a long line of federal decisions concerning post-
conviction, pre-sentence procedure.6 These cases, beginning with the 1949 
decision of the Supreme Court in Williams v. New York,1 established the 
rule that the failure of the trial court to afford the defendant, after an ad-
verse verdict or a plea of guilty,8 an opportunity to make a statement or 
present evidence in mitigation of his offense is not a denial of due process.o 
Although no case in this line of decisions is concerned with pre-sentence 
procedure under a multiple offender statute, there seems to be nothing in 
the Pennsylvania act requiring a departure from their rule. Any presenta-
a Release of relater on writ of habeas corpus was denied, since he was still properly 
imp,isoned by virtue of the portion of the sentence imposed solely for the voluntary man-
slaughter conviction. See Pennsylvania ex rel. Grierson v. Ashe, 353 Pa. 1, 44 A.2d 239 
(1945). See generally Sedler, Habeas Corpus in Pennsylvania After Conviction, 20 U. Prrr. 
L. REv. 652 (1959). 
4 204 F.2d 624 (3d Cir. 1953). 
Ii See Pennsylvania ex rel. Arnold v. Ashe, 156 Pa. Super. 451, 40 A.2d 875 (1945); 
Pennsylvania v. Johnson, 348 Pa. 349, 35 A.2d 312 (1944); Levell v. Simpson, 142 Kan. 892, 
52 P.2d 372 (1935). But cf. Delaware v. Moore, 49 Del. 29, 108 A.2d 675 (1954); Hill v. 
Hudspeth, 161 Kan. 376, 168 P.2d 922 (1946). 
6 See Hoover v. United States, 268 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1959); Application of Hodge, 
262 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1958); Thomas v. Teets, 220 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1955); Pence v. 
United States, 219 F.2d 70 (10th Cir. 1955); Klingstein v. United States, 217 F.2d 711 (4th 
Cir. 1954); Price v. United States, 200 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1953); Friedman v. United States, 
200 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 926 (1953); Taylor v. United States, 179 
F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 988 (1950); United States ex rel. Pascal v. 
Burke, 90 F. Supp. 868 (E.D. Pa. 1950); Sacks v. Canal Zone, 176 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1949), 
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 858 (1949). 
7 337 U.S. 241 (1949). See Comment, 49 CoLUM. L. REv. 567 (1949); Note, 48 l\frCH. L. 
REv. 523 (1950). 
8 Although the case of Williams v. New York, supra note 8, did not involve a guilty 
plea, eight of the ten cases cited in note 6 supra, following and developing the Williams 
rule, did involve pleas of guilty. 
9 Thomas v. Teets, supra note 6; United States ex rel. Pascal v. Burke, supra note 6. 
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tion of mitigating circumstances that could have been excluded, consistently 
with due process, upon a plea of guilty to a first offense seems to be equally 
excludable upon conviction of a second offense. In each case, the court has 
before it none of the details concerning the first offense, and the defendant's 
purpose is to supply the court with such details and with other matters 
favorable to him, in order to influence the court toward imposition of a 
lighter sentence. That the rule developed from Williams is analogous to 
cases involving multiple offender statutes is not to say, however, that an 
alleged second offender could be precluded from pleading the non-existence 
of any prior conviction and from having a hearing on that issue.10 Nor 
could he be prevented from challenging the validity of the prior convic-
tion.11 Where, however, the defendant admits the existence and does not 
challenge the validity of the prior conviction, as in both Collins and the 
principal case, the error in failing to inform him that he is being sentenced 
pursuant to a habitual criminal statute, under the rule derived from the 
Williams line of cases seems to involve no violation of procedural due proc-
ess under the Fourteenth Amendment.12 Certainly, the Williams rule 
may be subject to question; a hearing wherein the defendant, especially one 
who has pleaded guilty, may present matters in mitigation of his offense 
may seem much more fair. Nevertheless, in view of that rule and in view 
also of the unmistakable legislative intent to provide no hearing for second 
offenders under the Pennsylvania Habitual Criminal Act,13 Collins appears 
to provide an infirm foundation for the holding in the principal case.14 
John Edward Porter, S.Ed. 
10 See Rhea v. Edwards, 136 F. Supp. 671 (D.C. Tenn. 1955). 
11 See Gayes v. New York, 332 U.S. 145, 149 n.3 (1947). See also United States ex rel. 
Hamby v. Ragen, 178 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1949); United States v. Moore, 166 F.2d 102 (7th 
Cir. 1948). 
12 But where the court relies on a pre-sentence report containing materially untrue 
statements in determining sentence, and denies access to such report to the defendant, due 
process is denied. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948); Ex parte Hoopsick, 172 Pa. 
Super. 12, 91 A.2d 241 (1952). 
1s Notice and hearing on the issue of prior convictions is specifically provided in the 
act for accused fourth offenders. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §5108 (d) (1945). Provision for any 
similar procedure in the case of alleged second offenders is noticeably absent. 
14 Perhaps the decision would have rested more securely upon an interpretation of the 
notice and hearing due process requirements of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which, of 
course, may be found to be more stringent than those of the Fourteenth Amendment. PA. 
CONST. art. 1, §9. 
